Constitutional Law—Due Process—Insurance—State Regulation of Out-of-State Mail-Order Companies.—People v. United Nat\u27l Life Ins. Co by Johnson, Stephen L
Boston College Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 10
1-1-1968
Constitutional Law—Due
Process—Insurance—State Regulation of Out-of-
State Mail-Order Companies.—People v. United
Nat'l Life Ins. Co
Stephen L. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen L. Johnson, Constitutional Law—Due Process—Insurance—State Regulation of Out-of-State
Mail-Order Companies.—People v. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co, 9 B.C.L. Rev. 470 (1968),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol9/iss2/10
CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law—Due Process—Insurance—State Regulation of
Out-of-State Mail-Order Companies.—People v. United Nat'l Life Ins.
Co.'—United National Life Insurance Company, Pioneer Life Insurance
Company and National Liberty Life Insurance Company, were mail-order
insurance companies organized under the laws of states other than California.
None of the three maintained any office, agent or other representative within
California, nor had any applied for or received a certificate of authority to
transact the business of insurance in California as required by Section 700 of
the California Insurance Code?. Each company solicited, negotiated and con-
summated its insurance contracts exclusively by use of the mail. California
residents who, after receiving solicitation in the mail, wished to be insured by
either Pioneer or National would complete the required forms and mail them
together with the first premium to the company's office. Upon acceptance by
the company in its resident state, the policy would become effective. United's
procedure differed only to the extent that its policy was pre-indorsed and be-
came effective in California when the customer deposited in the mail the com-
pleted forms and required premium.
The Commissioner of Insurance brought suit to enjoin the companies
from transacting the business of insurance, directly or indirectly, by mail or
otherwise, within the State of California until they obtained a certificate of
authority as required by section 700. The defendants affirmatively defended
on the basis that California, under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, did not have the power to regulate the activities of foreign
insurers whose sole contact with the state was through the mail. The trial
court in entering summary judgment for the defendants sustained their claim.
On appeal by the commissioner, the California Supreme Court reversed and
HELD: The state has the constitutional power to regulate the transactions of
foreign insurers who do business with California residents exclusively by mail
from offices outside the state.
State regulation of interstate insurance transactions has a unique history.
In 1868, the United States Supreme Court held that the business of insurance
transacted across state lines was not interstate commerce, and therefore was
not subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause. 3 From that time
until 1944, based "on the rationalization that insurance was not commerce, yet
was business affected with a vast public interest, the states developed compre-
hensive regulatory and taxing systems." 4 The power of the states to legislate
on business activity affecting other states was limited solely by the jurisdic-
tional principles embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.3 In 1944, the Supreme Court reversed itself and held that interstate
1 66 Cal. 2d 577, 427 P.2d 199, 58 Cal. Rptr. 599, appeal dismissed, 88 S. Ct. 506
(1967).
2 Cal. Ins. Code § 700 (West 1955).
8 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
4 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1946).
5 Id. at 416.
470
CASE NOTES
transactions of insurance are interstate commerce and consequently subject
to the regulation of Congress.° In direct response to this holding, Congress
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act' which provides that absent federal legis-
lation dealing with the insurance business, the regulation and taxation of in-
surance "shall be subject to the laws of the several States . ..." 8 The Supreme
Court in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin 9 declared the McCarran-Ferguson
Act constitutional and stated that the act "clearly put the full weight of
[congressional] power behind existing and future state legislation to sustain
it from any attack under the commerce clause . . . ." 1° 'After the decision in
Benjamin, it seemed clear that absent specific federal legislation, state juris-
diction over interstate insurance transactions was subject only to the limita-
tions prescribed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
1962, this proposition was modified by State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards
Corp.11 In Todd, the United States Supreme Court apparently held that the
constitutionality of state regulation and taxation of interstate insurance
should be determined according to the due process standard existing prior to
the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The California Supreme Court in United used this reading of Todd as a
starting point in reasoning to its conclusion. The court felt that it had to
decide the issue presented according to cases decided prior to 1945, and
specifically that its decision had to be kept within the limits set by Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 12 St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas," and Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson. 14 Allgeyer was concerned with the validity of
a penalty imposed on Louisiana citizens who insured property in the state
with an insurer who had not complied with Louisiana law. St. Louis Cotton
Compress and Connecticut General involved taxes imposed on premiums paid
to foreign insurers who had insured property in the taxing state. In each
instance the Supreme Court declared the state action void under the due
process clause. The rationale in each case was the same. The insurance con-
tracts, which covered risks within the state and which gave rise to the con-
tested state action, were entered into outside the state; in addition, all
activities relevant to the making and to the performance of the contracts
were carried on outside the state. Consequently, because all activity occurred
outside the state, the state had no power to tax or regulate these activities. The
California court in discussing and analyzing these cases stressed that the
legislation was declared invalid precisely because no activity occurred within
the taxing or regulating state. 16
6 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964).
o 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
19 Id. at 431.
11 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
12 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
13 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
11 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
15 "This trilogy of cases merely tells us that where there are no activities within
the regulating state . . regulation will not meet due process tests." 66 Cal. 2d at 590,
427 P.2d at 207, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
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Continuing its treatment of pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act cases, the Cali-
fornia court discussed and relied heavily upon two other Supreme Court
cases, Osborn v. Odin"' and Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen." Osborn was
concerned with the constitutionality of a Virginia statute which required all
insurance companies, authorized to do business in that state, to use only
registered resident agents when insuring certain risks within Virginia. In
rejecting the claims of foreign insurers, licensed to do business in Virginia,
that the statute as to them was a violation of due process, the Court stated:
[Virginia] merely claims that her interest in the risks which these
contracts are designed to prevent warrants the kind of control she
has here imposed. This legislation is not to be judged by abstracting
an isolated contract written in New York from the organic whole of
the insurance business, the effect of that business on Virginia and
Virginia's regulation of it."
In Hoopeston, New York subjected certain foreign fire insurance associations
who employed agents to investigate risks within the state to the laws of New
York as a condition to their insuring property within New York. The associa-
tions contended that they were not subject to New York law since the insur-
ance contracts were signed in Illinois and losses were paid by checks mailed
from that state. In rejecting this contention, the Court stated: "Assuming that
the formalities of contract are carried on in Illinois, the issue remains whether
the insurance enterprise as a whole so affects New York interests as to give
New York the power it claims." 19
The California court concluded that the pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act
cases represented "two separate yet consistent trends of decision." 2° The deci-
sions were separate in that the philosophy applied in Osborn and Hoopeston
differed from that applied in earlier cases. The earlier cases laid emphasis on
the places of contracting and performance while Osborn and Hoopeston laid
emphasis on the contacts with the regulating state established by the insur-
ance transactions and the state's interest arising from such contacts. The
court maintained the cases were consistent—the earlier cases represented
"situations where there were no contacts sufficient to support the jurisdiction
of the regulating state." 22 Essentially, the contacts in United were that the
insureds were California residents and the defendants were continuously
soliciting business in California through the mail. Considered alone these
contacts probably would not be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. However,
when the state interest arising from these contacts is injected, the contacts
acquire a greater significance which, in the court's view, supports California's
action. The substantial state interest involved in United was not defined by
the court, but its existence, in view of the minimal contacts, was essential.
On the basis of the pre-McCarran-Ferguson Act decisions, and especially
16 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
17 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
18 310 U.S. at 62-63.
19 318 U.S. at 316.
20 66 Cal. 2d at 589, 427 P.2d at 207, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
21 Id.
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on the basis of the philosophy presented by Osborn and Hoopeston, the court
concluded, "interstate insurance transactions may properly be regulated when
they have sufficient contacts with the regulating state so as to give the latter a
substantial interest in the transactions." 22 The court's examination of the con-
tacts showed that the insureds were California residents and that the solicita-
tion of insurance actually took place in California where the individual
addressee received the advertising material and other forms. In analysing the
methods of solicitation, the court concluded that the defendants had solicited
insurance in California as manifestly as if they had solicited through repre-
sentatives physically present within the state. Although the court did not
make explicit the substantial state interest arising from these contacts, it did
state that California's interest was "obvious" and pointed out that some
insureds could become the responsibility of the state if the insurers were un-
willing or unable to comply with their policy provisions. 23
The significance of United lies in the fact that it represents the furthest
a state supreme court has gone in sanctioning state regulation of interstate
insurance transactions. In reaching this result, the California court relied upon
the philosophy expressed in Osborn and Hoopeston. These cases were con-
cerned, however, either with licensed foreign insurers (Osborn) or with foreign
insurers who employed agents to investigate risks within the regulating state
(Hoopeston), therefore, they were not precedents which demanded United's
result. In 1966, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Ministers Life & Cas.
Union v. Haase, 24 a case cited in United to further support the court's hold-
ing. The Wisconsin court also applied the Osborn-Hoopeston philosophy to
expand state power under the due process clause. In Ministers, the plaintiff,
a foreign direct mail-order insurance company not authorized to do business
in Wisconsin, challenged that state's taxing and regulating law which by its
terms purported to apply to the mail-order insurance business. The plaintiff
sought a judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional on the ground,
among others, that it was violative of due process. There, as in United, the
foreign insurer had no agent or office within the state and in general transacted
business by the use of the mail. Unlike the defendants in United, however,
the insurer in Ministers had more contacts with the regulating state which
included, among other things, group leaders. 25 The group leaders were resi-
dents of Wisconsin and were used as a means of selling the plaintiff's group-
life and group-franchise insurance. These group leaders were not agents, yet
they provided an additional contact upon which state interest could be built. 2°
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found Osborn and Hoopeston sufficient author-
ity to sanction the state's power to regulate the type of insurance transactions
represented by the facts. United applied the same basic principle of law as
22 Id .
23 66 Cal. 2d at 593, 427 P.2d at 209, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
24 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205 (1966). Justices
Harlan and Stewart were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
385 U.S. at 205.
25 The insurer in Ministers also used local doctors and national investigatory
agencies as a means of acquiring information for underwriting purposes. 30 Wis. 2d at
347, 141 N.W.2d at 289-90.
26 Id. at 358-59, 141 N.W.2d at 295.
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Ministers, but placed a greater strain on that principle because it sanctioned
a similar exercise of power where there were fewer contacts. In short, United is
the first state supreme court case which sanctions the regulation of direct
mail-order insurance companies where such companies maintain no agent or
anything resembling an agent within the regulating state.
The defendants in United appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court dismissed appeal on a finding that the controversy did not present
a substantial federal question. 27
 This action by the Court was, in effect, a
decision on the merits and the judgment of the California court is final. 28
The practical importance of United is revealed when it is realized what the
consequences could be now that the decision is final. Before United, a mail-
order insurer wishing to solicit California residents could easily evade that
state's law by operating out of a state in which it was licensed and by main-
taining no office, agent or anything resembling an agent within California.
Under the older concepts of due process, California would not have the power
to regulate or tax the insurer's transactions. 2° The effect of United is to pre-
clude this ability to evade insofar as California is concerned; if other states
follow California's lead, mail-order insurers will be unable to evade the
regulatory laws of the state where their customers reside.
California's procedure in subjecting foreign mail-order insurers to its
law was relatively simple. Section 700 of the California Insurance Code, a law
enacted in 1935, provides that a person is forbidden to "transact" the business
of insurance within California without first obtaining a certificate of authority
from the California Insurance Commissioners° Section 35, also enacted in
1935, describes by the use of rather broad language the activity which con-
stitutes the "transaction" of the insurance business. 31
 The activities of the
defendants clearly met this description, therefore, they became subject to the
regulatory provisions of section 700. 22
 States which have laws similar to sec-
tion 700 now have the power to subject foreign mail-order insurers to their
regulatory laws. 23
27 88 S. Ct. 506 (1967).
28 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959).
20 See G. Kline, Regulation of Mail Order Accident and Health Insurance 24-25
(1949).
38 Cal. Ins. Code § 700 (West 1955).
31
	 35 Transact. "Transact" as applied to insurance includes any of the following:
(a) Solicitation.
(b) Negotiations preliminary to execution.
Cal. Ins. Code § 35 (West 1955).
32 "It seems to us an ineluctable conclusion that through such 'solicitation' and
such 'negotiations preliminary to execution' defendants 'transact . . . insurance business
in this state.'" 66 Cal. 2d at 595, 427 P.2d at 210, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
33 In 1966, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners appointed a study
group to study the overall problems of unauthorized insurance. The study group, relying
on the validity of United and Ministers recommended that "an insurance commissioner
should utilize his existing statutory prohibition against unauthorized insurance and
definition of 'transacting business' to prohibit the doing of unauthorized insurance in his
state. . . ." American Life Convention-Life Insurance Association of America, Report
of the Study Group on Regulation and Taxation of Unauthorized Insurance 26 (1966).
For other state statutes which penalize or prohibit unauthorized insurance, see, e.g.,
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If the United court had reached the opposite result, there would seem to
be only one alternative by which the states could regulate all the activities of
mail-order insurers. The alternative centers around the idea that each state
could utilize its own laws to compel insurers incorporated within it to conform
to the laws of other states. This could be done on a reciprocal basis—the
incorporating state would forbid all domestic insurers, under penalty of loss
of license, from doing business in a state where they are not licensed, provided
such state has a similar law. "These statutes seem analogous to interstate
compacts, which suggest another possible solution to the problem, but the
statutes avoid the procedural difficulties of the compacts, especially the
necessities of concerted action and Congressional approval." 34 The most
effective statute, in theory, eliminates the reciprocal provision and simply
prohibits domestic insurers from doing business in any state where they are
not licensed. However, this type of statute in practice would not be entirely
effective. First, by eliminating the reciprocal provision, a state would make
itself an undesirable place for an insurer to incorporate, therefore, it is
unlikely that all states would enact such a law. Second, even assuming that
all states enact such a law, " he domestic insurance department, which is
probably overworked and understaffed, may be somewhat lax in enforcing
this particular statute which primarily benefits persons outside the state."35
The method of using the incorporating state is sound in a legal sense, but its
undesirability is revealed when its ineffectiveness is recognized. Most likely,
one reason for the ineffectiveness is that these statutes do not place primary
responsibility in the state with the greatest interest, the state of the insured.
The holding in United will also affect federal jurisdiction over certain
activity of mail-order insurers. Section 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 36
provides that the Federal Trade Commission Act "shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law."37 The Supreme Court has held that the state regulation must be
effective in order to preclude FTC junschction. 35 An opposite holding in
United would have rendered California's method of regulating mail-order
insurers who do business in California solely through the mail completely
ineffective. If the incorporating states of the insurers did not compel the in-
surers to comply with California law, the standard for FTC jurisdiction over
the activities of the mail-order insurers in California could very well have
been satisfied. This result would not have adequately protected California's
interest. The Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful unfair and
deceptive methods of competition in commerce," and confers upon the com-
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-20 (1960); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 521 (1964); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 47 (1954).
54 McGhee, Unlicensed Foreign Insurance Companies: The Jurisdictional and En-
forcement Problems, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 73, 83-84 (1952).
55 Hanson & Obenberger, Mail Order Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the
States to Regulate the Insurance Business, 50 Marg. L. Rev. 175, 334 (1966).
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1964).
37 Id. § 1012(6).
55 FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958). See Travelers Health Ass'n v.
FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
89 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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mission certain powers to prevent the prohibited activity. 40 If the commission
had jurisdiction over the business of foreign mail-order insurers in California
and chose to exercise that jurisdiction it would not have the power to compel
the insurers to comply with California law in regard to registration, solvency,
and service of process. Consequently, if California were denied jurisdiction,
foreign mail-order insurers could solicit business in the state free from sub-
stantial regulation.
As already indicated, the minimal contacts between the regulating state
and the insurance companies in United do indeed place a strain on the due
process requirement of a "sufficient nexus." The constitutional validity of
California's action turned, however, on the -correctness of the assumption by
the California Supreme Court that the contacts presented by the fact situation
gave California a substantial state interest in regulating the defendant com-
panies.
The interest of a state in the activities of foreign insurers has customarily
been given great weight in the determination of due process limitations on
state restrictive statutes. This fact is best exemplified by two Supreme Court
cases, Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginiau and McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co.,42 which were concerned with the validity of state action in subjecting
a foreign insurer to suit within the state by a state resident. The foreign
insurer in Travelers Health was a mail-order company whose contacts with
Virginia were quite similar to the contacts present in United. The major dif-
ference in the contacts was that the insurer in Travelers Health, solicited new
business in Virginia through the activities of unpaid local members. The
Supreme Court held that Virginia had the power under due process to require
the insurer to accept service of process by Virginia claimants on the Secretary
of the Commonwealth. In support of this holding, the Court emphasized the
state's interest in providing a local forum for those resident insureds who have
claims against foreign insurers. The Court stated: "Prior decisions of this
Court have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting
policy holders to seek redress only in some distant state where the insurer is
incorporated. The Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its
citizens from such injustice." 43
The McGee case was concerned with precisely the same state interest as
that involved in Travelers Health. In McGee, a beneficiary under a life insur-
ance policy, the obligations of which were assumed by the defendant, recovered
a judgment in a California court against the defendant based on that contract.
The defendant's principal place of business was in Texas and it maintained
no agent or office in California. So far as the record showed, the only contacts
with California consisted of the transactions involved under the policy in
question. The Court held that California obtained jurisdiction over the defen-
dant when the defendant was served by registered mail in Texas. The Court
stated: "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with that State . . . . It cannot
40 Id. § 45, 46.
41 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
42 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
43 339 US. at 649.
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be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means
of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims."'"
The relevance of state interest in insurance to the resolution of due pro-
cess issues is well established by the foregoing service of process cases as well
as by Osborn and Hoopeston. In areas other than insurance the state interest
does not seem to play as great a role. In Hanson v. Denkla, 45 the settlor of a
trust, while a resident of Pennsylvania, created a trust appointing the Dela-
ware Trust Co. as trustee. Later the settlor moved to Florida, and before her
death the Delaware Trust Co. remitted the income to her and also carried on
other acts of trust administration by use of the mail. One of the issues in the
case was whether the activities of the trustee constituted sufficient contact
with Florida to sustain that state's personal jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee. The Supreme Court, in denying Florida jurisdiction, distinguished
McGee on its facts and then stated, " [t] his case is also different from McGee
in that there the State had enacted special legislation (Unauthorized Insurers
Process Act) to exercise what McGee called its 'manifest interest' in providing
effective redress for citizens who had been injured by nonresidents engaged
in an activity that State treats as exceptional and subjects to special legisla-
tion."" The Seventh Circuit has read Hanson as limiting McGee to the
insurance field.47
When the validity of a state's regulation of a foreign insurer is challenged
as being unconstitutional under due process, Osborn and Hoopeston should be
sufficient authority to hold that state interest is a relevant factor. If a state's
taxation of a foreign insurer is challenged on similar grounds, state interest
again should be relevant. This is so because the United States Supreme Court
for jurisdictional purposes evidently has not distinguished between the taxa-
tion and regulation of interstate insurance transactions." Therefore, state
interest should be relevant where solely the power to tax is challenged. This
approach can be contrasted to that taken in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
44 355 U.S. at 223.
45 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
46 Id. at 252.
47 Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d. 821 (7th Cir. 1959). On state
in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations and the relevance of state interest,
see 13 U. Kan. L. Rev. 544 (1965); 50 Minn. L. Rev. 946 (1966); 5 Washburn L.J. 240
(1966).
48 The lack of distinction between the regulation and taxation of interstate insurance
is evidenced by the Todd case. 370 U.S. 451 (1962). Todd was a taxing case, and in
reaching its result the Court discussed the Allgeyer line of cases and also Osborn and
Hoopeston. Osborn and Hoopeston were clearly regulation cases, while with the ex-,
ception of Allgeyer, the earlier cases involved taxation.
Hanson in his article on mail-order insurers considered the due process standard
for regulation and taxation as essentially the same. Hanson and Obenberger, supra note
35, at 230.
In Ministers, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in upholding a statute which contained
both regulating and taxing provisions used precisely the same authority as United used to
uphold a regulating statute. 30 Wis. 2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S.
205 (1966).
Finally, the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the states to exercise jurisdiction in
respect to both regulation and taxation. 15 US.C. II 1011-15 (1964).
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Department of Revenue," the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the
jurisdictional restrictions imposed upon a state by the due process clause.
In National Hellas Hess, Illinois sought to compel an out-of-state vendor
to collect and remit the Illinois use tax. The vendor, National Bellas Hess,
Inc., had essentially the same contacts with Illinois as the defendants in United
had with California. The Court held that Illinois under due process could not
compel an out-of-state vendor to collect and remit the Illinois use tax where
such vendor maintained no retail outlet or agent within the state. An examina-
tion by the Court of the relevant precedent revealed a sharp distinction
"between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within
a State, and those who do no more than communicate with customers in
the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate
business."" The Court was unwilling to obliterate this distinction by uphold-
ing Illinois' exercise of power. In denying Illinois jurisdiction the Court did
not investigate the consequences of National Bellas Hess' business on Illinois
nor did it investigate the state's interest arising from such business." If this
rationale had been applied to the facts in United, it is doubtful that Cali-
fornia's action would have been upheld. However, previous insurance cases
involving the jurisdictional aspects of due process and the recent disposition
of United by the Supreme Court indicate that the rationale of National
Hellas Hess is inapplicable when the state interest concerns the business of
insurance.
It has been demonstrated that previous United States Supreme Court
cases make state interest in insurance a relevant factor in determining the
constitutionality of California's action; the only question remaining is whether
that interest is sufficient to support jurisdiction when the contacts are mini-
mal. California's interest in regard to the defendant's activities is revealed
by a brief investigation of the provisions of the California Insurance Code to
which the defendants are now subject. As a condition of admission to do busi-
ness in California, the code requires a certain minimum of paid-in capital, 52
a certain minimum of surplus requirements,53 and among other things, certain
renewal requirements for paid-in capital." In short, one of the major purposes
of the code is to guarantee that the foreign insurer is solvent when he conducts
business with California residents. Under section 704, 55 the commissioner has
the power to suspend the certificate of authority if, after a hearing, he finds
an insurer conducting his business in bad faith or in a fraudulent manner.
California's interest here is to protect its citizens from investing in and de- ,
pending upon an insolvent or fraudulent insurer. In addition, as mentioned in
the court's opinion, the state is interested in avoiding any financial responsi-
bility it may incur as a consequence of an insolvent insurer not being able to
4° 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
5° Id. at 758.
51 For a criticism of the decision in National Hellas Hess, see 9 B.C.Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 199 (1967).
52 Cal. Ins. Code § 700.01 (West 1955).
53 Id. § 700.02.
54 Id. § 700.03.
55 Id. § 704.
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compensate an insured in the event of serious loss." Finally, by requiring a
foreign insurer to appoint an agent for service of process," the state manifests
an interest in providing a local forum for California residents who may have
claims against a foreign insurer.
One defect in the United opinion is that it does not indicate how much
business the defendants had solicited in California but, assuming that the
business was substantial, it is difficult to maintain that California did not act
in pursuance of its legitimate interest when it subjected the defendants to
its regulatory laws. The propriety of California's action is supported by the
following statement by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Travelers
Health:
A state is helpless when the out-of-state company operates be-
yond the borders, establishes no office in the state, and has no agents,
salesmen, or solicitors to obtain business for it within the state.
Then it is beyond the reach of process. In the present case, however,
that is only the formal arrangement. The actual arrangement shows
a method of soliciting business within Virginia as active, continuous,
and methodical as it would be if regular agents or solicitors were em-
ployed."
It is evident that the effect of a foreign insurer upon a regulating state
is not dependant upon the number of agents the insurer employs in the state.
That fact coupled with the state interest, embodied in the California Insur-
ance Code should be sufficient to sanction the power exercised in United.
STEPHEN L. JoANsox
Estate Taxation—Marital Deduction—Finality of State Decree Deter-
mining Property Interest.—Commissioner v. Bosch.'—The testator, Her-
man Bosch, executed a trust agreement providing for the payment of trust
income to his wife for her life, and granting her a general power of appoint-
ment over the principal upon her death. Subsequently, the wife, to avoid the
inclusion of the trust corpus as part of her estate subject to federal tax
upon her death, executed a partial release of her power of appointment?
Upon the death of Bosch, his executor claimed the widow's trust as a marital
58 66 Cal. 2d at 593, 427 P.2d at 209, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
87 Cal. Ins. Code § 1600 (West 1955).
88 339 U.S. at 653-54.
1 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
2 Under the terms of the trust agreement created in 1930, and amended in 1931,
Mrs. Bosch was granted a general power of appointment over the trust corpus. On
October 25, 1951, Mrs. Bosch executed a release of her power to appoint the trust
corpus in favor of herself, her estate, her creditors or creditors of her estate. Under the
Internal Revenue Code, the value of the gross estate includes property with respect to
which a general power of appointment is exercised, but the Code also provides that the
exercise of a general power of appointment created before October 21, 1942, and partially
released prior to November 1, 1951, will not be deemed to be the exercise of a general
power of appointment. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041(a) (1).
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